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As our nation’s central bank, the Federal
Reserve System plays a vital role in promoting
a smoothly functioning economy. The Federal
Reserve pursues basic macroeconomic goals of
price stability and full employment in fulfilling
its responsibilities for monetary policy, banking
supervision, and payments-system operations.
By providing payments-system services, such as
electronic transfers and check-processing, the
Federal Reserve facilitates the exchange of funds
that is necessary to complete economic transac-
tions. This third role, to provide efficient clearing
of payments, frequently goes unnoticed. Most
individuals do not know how the checks they
deposit are collected. And if the system keeps on
working as well as it has in the recent past, they
probably never will.
Completing the payments required in eco-
nomic transactions involves risks.1 Banks expose
themselves to financial risks by accepting for
deposit checks drawn on other banks, especially
when the banks clear these payments among
themselves through clearinghouses or correspon-
dent banks.2 These risks increase during periods
of economic and financial stress.
The Federal Reserve System offers an alter-
native to clearing payments through clearing-
houses and private wire transfer networks. Banks
that use the Fed’s payment services reduce their
risk exposure. Therefore, during periods of finan-
cial stress, the Federal Reserve provides a safer
means of completing payments, permitting eco-
nomic transactions to continue without worry
about how the payments will clear.
The purpose of this article is to establish
empirically the significant effect the Texas bank-
ing crisis had on check-clearing within and out-
side the Federal Reserve System. Historically,
banking crises often caused or exacerbated a
decline in real economic activity, resulting in lost
jobs and income. The Federal Reserve System,
along with other government programs, limited
the damage from the Texas banking crisis. One
factor minimizing the spillover effect of the bank-
ing crisis to the nonfinancial sectors was the Fed’s
providing a safer method of clearing payments.
How checks are cleared
A check can be cleared—that is, presented
to the bank on which it was drawn—by several
different methods in the private sector. The bank
that receives the check in deposit is called the
bank of first deposit (BOFD); the bank on which
the check is drawn is called the paying bank. The
BOFD can present the check directly to the pay-
ing bank, present the check through a clearing-
house, or engage the services of a correspondent
T he purpose of this article
is to establish empirically the
significant effect the Texas banking
crisis had on check-clearing within
and outside the Federal Reserve System.
Historically, banking crises often
caused or exacerbated a decline in real
economic activity, resulting in lost jobs
and income. The Federal Reserve
System, along with other government
programs, limited the damage
from the Texas banking crisis.14
bank to present the check to the paying bank.3
The collecting bank could physically pre-
sent the check directly to the paying bank and
demand payment in what is called direct present-
ment (Figure 1). But with nearly 27,000 deposi-
tory institutions in the United States, it would be
highly inefficient and costly to deliver checks to
every paying bank nationally or even regionally.
To improve efficiency, banks within a city or
region often form clearinghouses where partici-
pating banks present the checks drawn on all the
other participating banks (Clearinghouse A in
Figure 1). About 20 percent of all U.S. financial
institutions are members of clearinghouses, which
range in size from two to more than 600 mem-
bers.4 Membership in a clearinghouse association
offers a financial institution a low-cost alternative
to paying an intermediary for check collection
services. Member institutions in the generally
nonprofit associations establish rules regarding
how and when they present checks and credit/
debit accounts through the exchange.
When a BOFD receives a check for deposit
drawn on a bank that is not a member of its
clearinghouse, it must use an alternate method to
present the check. Direct presentment is still an
option, but it could be costly. The BOFD often
deposits the check at a correspondent bank
(Correspondent Bank A in Figure 1). Correspon-
dent banks, often called simply correspondents,
are usually large commercial banks that clear
substantial volumes of checks. These banks have
established extensive arrangements to clear checks,
maintain equipment to sort checks, and contract
for air and ground transportation to deliver checks
regionally or nationally. A bank using the services
of a correspondent is called a respondent bank
or a respondent. Staying within the private sector,
the correspondent can present the check directly
to the paying bank, or indirectly through a clear-
inghouse where both the correspondent and the
paying bank are members (Clearinghouse B in
Figure 1), or it can present the check to another
correspondent (Correspondent Bank B in Figure
Figure 1
Alternative Ways to Present a Check for Collection
NOTE: Both the bank of first deposit and the paying bank are members of Clearinghouse A.
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1) that services the paying bank, either directly or
through a clearinghouse.
The Federal Reserve Banks offer check-
clearing services similar to those correspondents
offer. Any U.S. depository institution can pur-
chase payment-clearing services from the Federal
Reserve.5 The Fed presents the checks either
directly to the paying bank or the paying bank’s
correspondent (or third-party processor) or trans-
ports the checks to another Federal Reserve
facility for direct presentment to the paying bank
or the paying bank’s correspondent (or proces-
sor). The Fed operates a network of forty-six
Federal Reserve Banks, branches, and Regional
Check Processing Centers to clear checks. This
system supports the Federal Reserve’s task of
providing sorting and transportation of checks
drawn on any depository institution in the coun-
try. The Federal Reserve clears approximately
one-third of the total checks written and pre-
sented for collection to institutions.
In check collection, the Federal Reserve
competes most directly with correspondents. The
Federal Reserve Banks’ largest competitors, how-
ever, are also their largest customers. Correspon-
dents often use the Federal Reserve to collect
checks drawn on paying banks that are not
members of a mutual clearinghouse or that can be
presented more economically by being passed to
the Federal Reserve for handling.
A closer look at correspondent
banking relationships
Many smaller institutions clear most or all
payments through correspondents. Correspon-
dents typically operate on either a regional or
national basis. Regional correspondents rely on
either the Federal Reserve Banks or national
correspondents to collect checks on more remote
banks. National correspondents compete with the
Federal Reserve on a national level, presenting
checks for payment to as many as 200 other
institutions.6 A correspondent also may handle
wire transfers and provide automated clearing-
house (ACH) services for other institutions.
Correspondents provide a variety of ser-
vices in addition to payment processing and
clearing. These include currency and coin ser-
vices, Treasury tax and loan (TT&L) clearing,
securities safekeeping and clearing, securities
purchase, federal funds purchase and sales, cash
management, investment services, credit card
services, data processing, international banking,
trust services, and loan participations. The Fed-
eral Reserve provides only some of these services.
Service bureaus and third-party processors are
alternative service providers in payment-clearing,
data processing, international banking, safekeep-
ing, and credit card services.
In a correspondent relationship, the respon-
dent typically keeps balances with the correspon-
dent for the purpose of clearing payments. The
respondent’s primary risk in this relationship is
that the correspondent could fail, and the respon-
dent could lose the uninsured portion of the
clearing account. Furthermore, if the respondent
has lent federal funds to the correspondent, these
uninsured funds could be lost. Even if the funds
are not lost, access to them could be disrupted
while the federal deposit insurer is closing the
correspondent.
The risk exposure of the correspondent to a
respondent’s failure is less than that of the respon-
dent to the correspondent’s failure. Correspon-
dents expose themselves to risk if they are
providing credit to the respondent, usually as very
short-term credit, such as federal funds sold. If the
respondent were to fail, the correspondent would
return the checks drawn on the respondent to the
bank of first deposit. Thus, the correspondent
protects itself from risk of loss, but it may incur a
significant cost in returning these checks.
Probably the most important event in mak-
ing respondents aware of their risk exposures was
the collapse of Continental Illinois National Bank
in 1984. While no respondent lost funds in
Continental, the respondents became aware that
losses were possible, depending on the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) method
of resolving the bank failure.
Continental’s financial condition deterio-
rated rapidly during spring 1984. On May 17,
the FDIC, the Federal Reserve System, and the
Comptroller of the Currency announced a tempo-
rary assistance program. In June 1984, the FDIC
estimated that 2,299 commercial banks held de-
posits at Continental and that 179 of these banks
might fail if Continental failed. Furthermore, Con-
tinental had been active in international financial
markets, prompting concerns that its failure could
trigger an international financial crisis. The FDIC
designed an assistance program for the Continen-
tal collapse that protected all of Continental’s
respondents and correspondents from loss.
Continental’s collapse made banks much
more aware of their risk exposure in correspon-
dent banking relationships, although preliminary
reports seriously overestimated the problem’s
severity.7 While regulators treated Continental’s
continued operation as essential to maintaining
stable financial markets, small banks were con-
cerned that other correspondents might not be
considered “too big to fail.” Alternative FDIC
responses to bank failures, such as liquidation,16
might cause respondents with deposits above the
insured limits to lose the uninsured portions of
their deposits.
In times of financial stress, such as occurred
in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District in the late
1980s, banks seek to lower their risk exposure.8
The Federal Reserve offers a risk-free alternative
method of collecting payments. While the Federal
Reserve requires banks to maintain an account,
there is no risk that the Fed could fail. Therefore,
the balances in these Fed accounts are safer than
if respondents deposited them at correspondents.
By risk-free, we mean there is no danger the
Federal Reserve will fail as the payment proces-
sor. The party seeking payment still may not be
paid if the bank on which the payment is drawn
refuses to honor the check because it is drawn on
insufficient funds, has an invalid endorsement, is
forged, or for a variety of other legal reasons. But
these reasons have a well-established precedent
in law, and the procedures to return the payment
are well-defined.
If respondents become concerned that their
correspondent might fail, they could present their
checks for collection through the Federal Reserve
and avoid the risk exposure associated with
clearing through the correspondents. Similarly, if
the financial condition of a broad cross-section of
respondents were to deteriorate, correspondents
could decide their risk exposure in providing
correspondent services is too large and exit the
business. Their exit would leave some respon-
dents and their customers with limited access to
wholesale banking services.
Breakdown in correspondent banking
during the Texas banking crisis
Financial institutions in the Eleventh District
suffered unprecedented upheaval in the 1980s. Oil
prices weakened in 1982 and virtually collapsed
in 1986, precipitating a host of asset-quality prob-
lems at the District’s financial institutions. In
addition, severe overbuilding created a glut of
commercial real estate space. Return on average
assets of District commercial banks turned nega-
tive in 1986. Problems with business loans sur-
faced initially, but problem real estate loans
eventually overshadowed them. Commercial bank
failures in the Eleventh District rose sharply in the
latter half of the 1980s, as shown in Figure 2.9
Thrift institutions in the Eleventh District
suffered even more severe losses during this
period. Nearly half of all District thrifts were
insolvent at the end of 1988. At the end of 1989,
less than one-fourth of the thrifts in the District
were both profitable and solvent. The number of
thrift closures would have been extremely high,
but inadequate funding of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) pre-
vented thrift regulators from aggressively closing
insolvent thrifts through most of the 1980s.
Financial-sector difficulties in the Eleventh
District reached heights not observed since the
Great Depression. Unlike the events that occurred
during the 1930s, though, widespread financial
panic was not evident. Depositor confidence in
the latter half of the 1980s was maintained,
primarily due to the existence of federal deposit
insurance. While not without serious unintended
consequences, the federal guarantee of deposits
was successful in averting widespread financial
market instability, despite epidemic commercial
bank and thrift failures.10 However, as evidence
mounted that several large financial institutions in
the Eleventh District were facing severe prob-
lems, some large, uninsured depositors moved
their funds elsewhere. This movement of funds
presumably reflected the fear that deposits in
excess of insured limits might be lost.11
Widespread instability was also averted by
several innovative techniques for resolving finan-
cial-sector distress. New resolution techniques
implemented by the FSLIC and the FDIC were
often successful in achieving an orderly transition
in cases of thrift and commercial bank insol-
vencies.12 Moreover, legislation passed in 1980
extended Federal Reserve discount window privi-
leges to all depository institutions, providing an
additional tool for averting a financial crisis.
As conditions in the Eleventh District’s
financial community began to erode, corres-
pondent banking relationships became strained
and sometimes broken. After several small insti-
tutions failed during the early years of decline,
correspondents closely monitored respondents.
Figure 2
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Any negative speculation about a respondent’s
condition often caused a correspondent to stop
payment-processing or sever the relationship with
the respondent completely. The Federal Reserve
frequently became the payments processor for
these respondents.
As the decline continued and the financial
health of larger institutions deteriorated, the con-
cerns reversed. The financial instability of many
of the District’s large correspondents caused
respondents to seek other payment-processing
arrangements. The number of changes in pay-
ment-processing arrangements increased by 57
percent in the years following the failures of the
largest District banks.13
An empirical test
While anecdotal evidence is interesting, a
statistical test of the effect of bank conditions on
Federal Reserve check-clearing volumes is neces-
sary to control for other factors that might have
affected Fed check-clearing operations. We there-
fore constructed and estimated a model of check-
processing volumes at the twelve Federal Reserve
Districts.
In the model, Federal Reserve check-pro-
cessing volumes are assumed to be related to the
level of economic activity within each Federal
Reserve District and the state of the banking
industry within each District. The following re-
gression equation is estimated:
(1) CHECKS = β0 + β1 ∗ ECONOMY
+ β2 ∗ FINANCIAL + E,
where CHECKS represents the total volume of
checks processed at each Federal Reserve.14
ECONOMY is an employment measure included
to control for business-cycle effects on the vol-
ume of check-clearing. FINANCIAL  represents
variables used to proxy for the financial condition
of the banking industry, and E is a random error.
The number of checks processed by each Federal
Reserve District is published in the Planning and
Control System Quarterly Data, Division of Fed-
eral Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.15
The economic activity variable, ECONOMY,
is nonagricultural employment in each Federal
Reserve District.16 This variable is estimated by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, using annual
county-level data and monthly state-level data,
with an adjustment for industrial mix by county.
The number of checks processed is expected to
be positively correlated with economic activity.
Three different measures of financial-sector
condition are tested. First, the ratio of nonper-
forming loans to total loans at District commercial
banks is expected to have a positive impact on the
volume of checks processed by the Federal Re-
serve. That is, as nonperforming loans increase,
indicating a deteriorating banking sector, the
volume of checks processed by the Federal Re-
serve should rise. Second, the capital ratio of
District commercial banks is also used to gauge
the strength of the banking sector.17 Here, a
negative relationship is expected. As the capital
ratio declines, the volume of checks processed
should rise, if indeed the Federal Reserve is acting
as the “processor of last resort.” Third, the number
of bank failures in each District is included as an
explanatory variable to measure financial turmoil.
The expected sign on the bank failure variable is
positive. We obtained the bank financial ratios
from the Report of Condition and Income and the
number of bank failures from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
The data are a pooled time series cross-
section utilizing the twelve Federal Reserve Dis-
tricts over the period from fourth-quarter 1982
to fourth-quarter 1993. Using cross-section data
should improve the quality of the test by in-
creasing the variability of explanatory variables.
Furthermore, the Eleventh District was not the
only District that experienced a weak financial
sector. Including other Districts decreases the
likelihood that an increase in Federal Reserve
check-processing volume would be inappropri-
ately attributed to financial-sector weakness.
Because pooled data are used, an error
components model was assumed in the estima-
tion procedure. The assumption underlying this
model is that the disturbance term in the regres-
sion is composed of three independent compo-
nents: one component associated with time, one
associated with the cross-section units, and the
third component is assumed to vary in both time
and spatial dimensions.
In the following model:
yX iN tT it itk
k
p
ki t = + =… =…
= ∑
1
11 βε ;, ;, ,
N is the number of cross-sections, T  is the length
of the time series, and p is the number of
independent variables. Under the error compo-
nents model, the random errors, it, are assumed
to have the following decomposition:
it = ui + vt + wit,
where ui ∼ N(0, σ 2
u),
vt ∼ N(0, σ 2
t ), and
wit ∼ N(0, σ 2
it ).
The individual error components are assumed to18
satisfy the following conditions:
E(uivt)=E(uiwit) = E(vtwit) = 0,
E(uiuj)=0 ( i ≠ j ),
E(vtvs)=0 ( t ≠ s),
E(witwis)=E(witwjt) = E(witwjs) = 0
(i ≠ j; t ≠ s).
Generalized least squares estimation pro-
duces consistent parameter estimates.18 Because
the estimates of the first-order autocorrelation
coefficients are very close to 1, first differences of
all the variables (in logs) are used in the estimation
(with the exception of the bank failure variable).19
Several different tests are conducted for
determining the appropriate pooling method.
The tests show that the error components ap-
proach is statistically superior to the hypothesis
that no differences existed across Federal Reserve
Districts, and it is superior to the hypothesis that
the inter-District differences are fixed effects.
The results of estimating equation 1 appear
in Table 1. Four models are tested, all of which
show that Federal Reserve check-processing vol-
umes are positively correlated with the level of
economic activity. Models 3 and 4 utilize the
capital ratio as the indicator of bank financial
condition; it is significant, with the expected sign
in both cases. Models 1 and 2 use nonperforming
loans as the indicator of bank condition; it is
insignificant in explaining Federal Reserve check-
processing volumes. Similarly, bank failures, which
are included in models 1 and 3, are insignificant
as an explanatory variable.
These results support the hypothesis that
banks increase their use of Federal Reserve check-
clearing services when banking conditions de-
teriorate. Banks appear to be most concerned
about bank capitalization.20 This implies that
banks have foresight and act in anticipation of
potential bank failures. The insignificance of the
bank failure variable suggests that respondent
and correspondent banks respond before the
banks actually fail. This evidence is consistent
with Federal Reserve attempts to maintain a
smoothly functioning payments system in the face
of unprecedented financial-sector distress.
The insignificance of nonperforming loan
ratios in models 1 and 2 suggests that banks are
more focused on the immediate indicator of
failure, bank capitalization, rather than on an
indicator of potential future reductions in capital.
Nonperforming loans may be an indicator of
future declines in capital, but a well-capitalized
bank could sustain higher than average non-
performing loans and remain solvent.
A final test is conducted to determine if the
relationship between the financial condition of
banks and the volume of Federal Reserve check-
clearing existed only in those Federal Reserve
Districts that could be characterized as suffering
severe banking crises. This is done by including
an interaction term, which is the cross-product of
the measure of banking difficulties with a dummy
variable for each of the Federal Reserve Districts.
The results are not affected. In models that
included nonperforming loans (1 and 2), the
employment variable remains significant, and the
only interaction terms that are significant are for
the Eighth and Tenth Districts. For models with
capital ratios (3 and 4), the employment variable
and capital variable are statistically significant,
while none of the interaction terms is significant.
This test implies that banks across the country
were sensitive to the financial condition of the
banking industry in their Districts when deciding
on a check-processing arrangement.
The impact of the Texas banking crisis
on Federal Reserve payment services
The financial industry problems not only
caused an increase in checks processed by the
Fed’s Eleventh District operations, as shown above,
but also increased the amount of handling these
checks required. Eleventh District check-process-
ing volume increased by 9.8 percent from 1987 to
1989, while the other Federal Reserve Districts
averaged only a 2.8-percent increase. The above-
average increase in the Eleventh District was
largely attributed to increased check volume from
banks with total deposits between $30 million and
$500 million. Check volume from these banks
cleared through the Fed increased by more than
50 percent between 1987 and 1989 and accounted
for 64 percent of the total increase in all checks
processed by the Eleventh District Fed.
These small to mid-size institutions were
most often respondents that previously cleared
payments through correspondents. Often, these
institutions viewed their processing with the Fed-
eral Reserve as only a temporary arrangement.
Because the Fed does not supply all correspon-
dent services, these banks intended to resume
payment-processing with a new correspondent.
The increase in Eleventh District processed check
volume was particularly significant because of the
associated check-handling requirements. The Fed’s
new customers sent most of the additional vol-
ume with limited presorting done to the checks.
This meant more sorting and handling of the
checks by the Reserve Banks.
Various check-processing support areas also
faced increased demands and pressures. Fre-
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vices from the Fed on short notice. The Fed often
had to handle these checks on an exception basis
until databases could be updated, forms could be
delivered, and notifications completed. The new
management of failed banks that had been ac-
quired often requested changes in delivery of
processed checks and associated accounting in-
formation. If the FDIC liquidated a failed paying
bank, the Fed had to intercept and return these
checks to the BOFD. The additive effect of
ownership changes, correspondent changes, liq-
uidations, and branching meant three to four
changes daily in sorting procedures for Dallas
Office check operations. The updating required
to the District’s Customer Information System
(CIS) database increased significantly from 1986
to 1990. By 1988, updates to the CIS required
about four hours of clerical time daily at the
Federal Reserve Dallas Office, and half of the
requested changes required same-day handling.
Outlook for the future
The Eleventh District banking industry has
recovered from its financial difficulties; therefore,
the pressure on the payments system has been
reduced. The improvement in performance,
coupled with the resolution of failed commercial
banks, has resulted in a substantial improvement
in the health of District commercial banks. Assets
held by healthy commercial banks rose from less
than 30 percent of total Eleventh District commer-
cial banking assets in 1988 to 97 percent in third-
quarter 1994.21 By the end of third-quarter 1994,
only 9 percent of the Eleventh District’s commer-
cial banks could be characterized as unhealthy,
and these were smaller than average banks hold-
ing only 3 percent of total commercial banking
assets in the District.
The improvement in the health of the Elev-
enth District commercial banking industry has
resulted in increased correspondent banking ac-
tivity in payment-processing and other services.
With consolidated operations and improved effi-
ciencies, the correspondents have improved their
competitive position and have seen opportunities
to generate fee income. In addition, the risk of
providing correspondent services has declined as
banking conditions have improved.
As banks have established new correspon-
dent relationships, Federal Reserve service trends
again have changed. From 1990 to 1993, the
Eleventh District saw a 1.3-percent increase in
checks submitted for processing and collection,
versus a 12-percent increase from 1985 to 1989. As
correspondents attempt to avoid costs and opti-
mize use of existing check-processing capability,
the Eleventh District has received more checks
that require little or no machine sorting.
The other significant change resulted from
statewide branching of the large holding compa-
Table 1
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nies. As bank holding companies consolidated
their affiliated banks into branches, they changed
their check routing numbers to that of the lead
bank in the holding company. This change cre-
ated a substantial shift in workload at the Dallas
Fed, with additional checks deposited early in the
day for processing. The workload shift required
changes in personnel, work schedules, and as-
signed duties.
The Federal Reserve provides
a needed safety valve
The Federal Reserve System provides a risk-
free method of clearing payments. The account
balances held at the Federal Reserve that are
necessary to clear payments are not exposed to
risk even during periods of financial crisis. Some
have called the Federal Reserve the “processor of
last resort.” A more accurate description would be
that in a financial crisis, there is a “flight to qual-
ity.” Our empirical test demonstrates that Federal
Reserve check-processing volumes rose when
banking conditions deteriorated.22 The Fed repre-
sents the safest method of clearing payments.
If the Federal Reserve could not provide this
risk-free payment-clearing service, then turmoil
in the financial markets could have negative
effects on the economy. Difficulty in determining
how the payment for a transaction would clear
might hamper the sales of goods and services.
Such problems would place an additional cost on
businesses and could slow an already weak
economy. At a minimum, without the Federal
Reserve’s payment operations as a backstop,
businesses and banks would have to invest in
reducing payments-system risk. Banks might need
to maintain multiple correspondent relationships,
and businesses might alter their policies for ac-
cepting payment, such as requiring payments to
clear before delivery of goods.
For the Federal Reserve to maintain the
ability to respond to a financial crisis, it must
maintain an ongoing payment-clearing operation
that can be expanded as necessary. Such opera-
tions are complex and cannot be established
overnight. A financial crisis can develop faster
than the Fed could establish a payment-clearing
operation from scratch.
The banking crisis in the Eleventh District is
an example of the Federal Reserve’s response to
the temporary needs of financial institutions dur-
ing a crisis. Now that the Eleventh District’s
economy and its banking industry have recov-
ered, the Fed’s role in clearing payments has
diminished. Perhaps the one positive result of the
regional economic downturn and the banking
crisis that followed was the test of the Federal
Reserve System’s ability to clear payments and
minimize spillover from the banking crisis to the
payments system.
Notes
1 Before the creation of the Fed, the risk involved in
accepting a check as payment was more explicit.
Parties accepting checks often discounted the face
value to reflect the cost and risk of clearing. One
reason for creating the Fed was to establish on-par
clearing of checks. On-par clearing requires that a
check not be discounted—that is, that it be accepted
for its full face value.
2 The term bank is used in this article to refer to any
depository institution, including commercial banks,
savings and loan associations, mutual savings
banks, and credit unions. Where necessary to make
a distinction, the term commercial bank is used to
refer to institutions chartered by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency or state banking agen-
cies and typically insured by the Bank Insurance
Fund managed by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
3 If a check drawn on one bank is deposited by another
customer of the same bank, then there is no collection
process. The bank simply debits the account of the
party that wrote the check and credits the account of
the party that deposited the check.
4 U.S. General Accounting Office (1989, 37).
5 The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 mandates that Federal Reserve
services be available to all U.S. depository institutions
and that the Fed charge an appropriate price for these
services. Fed pricing is set as a markup over costs,
with an adjustment factor for the profits the private
sector would require and the taxes the private sector
must pay.
6 U.S. General Accounting Office (1989, 12).
7 For a detailed analysis of the number of likely commer-
cial bank failures that might have resulted from the
Continental failure, see the staff report entitled “Conti-
nental Illinois National Bank Failure and Its Potential
Impact on Correspondent Banks” in U.S. House of
Representatives (1984).
8 The Eleventh Federal Reserve District includes Texas,
northern Louisiana, and southern New Mexico.
9 For more on the performance of Eleventh District
financial institutions in the past decade, see Robinson
(1990).
10 For more on the problems associated with federal
deposit insurance, see Kane (1989, 1985). Subsi-
dized deposit insurance with uniform premiums
encouraged bankers to take greater risks and
discouraged depositors from carefully monitoring
banks’ risks.
11 For example, as FirstRepublic Bank’s troubles became
increasingly apparent, depositors began shifting theirFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 21 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1995
funds to safer institutions. From December 1987 to
mid-February 1988, FirstRepublic lost a total of $1.14
billion in average deposits (Apcar 1988).
12 For a discussion of these new techniques and their
related problems, see Cole (1990) and Kane (1989).
13 Each change in processing arrangement required an
update to the Eleventh District’s Customer Information
System (CIS). Numerous updates to the CIS reflected
the shift of clearing arrangements and the commercial
bank merger activity driven largely by commercial
bank failures. In the two years before 1988, the
average annual number of changes in correspondent
banking relationships was 237.5 in the Dallas Office of
the Eleventh District. The failures of major Eleventh
District commercial banks began in 1988. In the
following three years, the average number of changes
in correspondent bank relationships rose to an esti-
mated 373 in the Dallas Office. By comparison, in
1993, there were only 184 changes in the Dallas
Office’s correspondent banking relationships.
14 While the optimal dependent variable would probably
be market share, such data do not exist.
15 One variable that would have improved the model is,
of course, the price of Federal Reserve check-clearing
services relative to private-sector prices. Unfortunately,
such pricing data do not exist. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that the Fed was receiving the costlier
checks to clear, which would drive up the Fed’s prices
relative to the private sector. This relative price effect
would be in the opposite direction of the empirically
significant effect that banks seek safer clearing
arrangements in chaotic times.
16 Retail sales may be a better measure of economic
activity that would correspond to the need to clear
checks. Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct a
retail sales variable by Federal Reserve District. A test
of this model based solely on Texas retail sales data
and Eleventh Federal Reserve District check-clearing
was not materially different in results. Furthermore, the
Pearson correlation coefficient between retail sales in
Texas and employment in Texas was 0.97.
17 The capital ratio is the Tier I equity-to-asset ratio.
18 See Fuller and Battese (1974).
19 While there may be some concern that the model is
picking up a secular trend of declining capital ratios
and increasing Federal Reserve check-clearing
volumes, the fact that the model is estimated in first
differences and that there is no evidence of residual
autocorrelation alleviates such concerns.
20 Current capital ratios are released on a lagged basis,
especially for small banks. Tests with lagged values of
capital ratios were insignificant. This result suggests
that banks have knowledge of the financial condition
of their correspondents and respondents, and the
current capital ratio is a reasonable proxy for this
knowledge.
21 A simple definition of a healthy commercial bank is one
with a capital ratio at least a half of a percent above
regulatory minimums, troubled assets less than 3
percent of total assets, and profits.
22 The Eleventh Federal Reserve District is not the only
example. See Clair, Kolson, and Robinson (1994) for
details of the effects of the Rhode Island crisis and the
failure of the Bank of New England on Federal Reserve
check-clearing.
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